1. Introduction
Evacuations serve as a protective action for individuals and communities in coastal areas of the United States at risk of tropical storms and hurricanes (Kruger at al. 2020). Evacuation decisions are not taken lightly, with government officials relying on meteorological forecasting such as anticipated storm trajectory, wind speeds, and storm surge levels along with potential inland flooding projections. State and local emergency management officials develop plans for mass evacuations that require the estimation of populations at risk of natural hazards, preidentifying evacuation routes and requirements for public sheltering, and strategies to support individuals unable to self-evacuate. In addition, plans may include strategies for local governmental and nongovernmental organizations to assist vulnerable populations with mobility restrictions including those with access, functional, and cognitive needs, and populations that do not have access to a personal vehicle (Meyer et al. 2018).
Evacuation plans typically commence 72–96 h prior to hurricane landfall, providing an adequate amount of time for a mass evacuation that considers COVID-19 safety measures (Florida Division of Emergency Management 2020; Kruger et al. 2020). When evacuation orders are given, both residents and visitors in coastal areas subjected to storm surge are encouraged to move farther inland and to areas at a higher elevation. Furthermore, individuals living in manufactured homes and those living in low-lying, flood-prone areas may be encouraged to evacuate as well (Kruger et al. 2020).
Typically, voluntary evacuation orders are issued to encourage individuals to prepare for the possibility of a mandatory evacuation order being issued. Evacuation orders vary from state-to-state with either local or state government issuing a mass evacuation order. According to the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act (Louisiana Disaster Act) (2003), the parish president at the local level will issue an evacuation order for residents in at-risk areas with the governor having the capability of ordering a forced evacuation for one or more parishes in Louisiana, if necessary, whereas in Alabama, the State Emergency Management Agency and the governor would issue a mandatory evacuation order (Kruger et al. 2020). Residents are not forcibly removed nor incur a criminal penalty for ignoring a mandatory evacuation order. Ultimately it is up to the resident to make the decision to leave with the understanding that all public services will be suspended and individuals that did not choose to evacuate may not have access to lifesaving medical assistance or rescue [Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act (Louisiana Disaster Act) 2003]. Further, those who are not in an evacuation zone may choose to evacuate despite not being encouraged to. This phenomenon is called shadow evacuation (Baker 1991).
In the age of the COVID-19 pandemic, disaster planning and management have become increasingly complex. This could not be more true than in the case of hurricane evacuations, where the expected movement and congregation of people ensures they are out of harm’s way, yet is in direct conflict with social distancing as an infection control measure. The 2020 hurricane season, in particular, posed a unique threat as both emergency managers and affected individuals had to plan for and react to complex public health threats such as Hurricanes Laura and Sally. Decision-making and risk perception was put to the test: will an individual prioritize their need to evacuate from a hurricane-risk zone or their desire to socially distance? Do people perceive shelters as a safe space or more of a risk? How will hotels and their employees, used both by individuals and government officials as emergency shelters, function in their new role considering COVID-19 safety protocols? Our previous study (Collins et al. 2021), examined intended hurricane evacuation behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic, whereas this study presented herein, focusing on Hurricanes Laura and Sally, examines actual hurricane evacuation decision-making during the COVID-19 pandemic. In this paper, we explore actual hurricane evacuation decision-making during the COVID-19 pandemic using a survey tool that was disseminated via extensive professional networks immediately after Hurricanes Laura and Sally in 2020. Research findings provide not only extended knowledge on sociological perspective during complex disasters but also necessary guidance for future planning during pandemic-hurricane events in the United States (Lindell et al. 2011; Whytlaw et al. 2021).
To put these hurricanes and evacuations in context, just prior to August and September of 2020, in July of 2020 new COVID-19 (alpha B.1.1.7 and Q lineages) cases peaked in the United States, and deaths peaked in the first two weeks of August (World Health Organization 2022). This was the first wave of COVID-19 in the Americas and occurred prior to COVID-19 vaccine development and availability. However, the U.S. media and many U.S. politicians, prior to and during Hurricanes Laura and Sally, were presenting contradictory reports and analysis of the infectiveness and lethality of COVID-19. For instance, a Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) Health Tracking poll from September 2020 found that “nearly half of adults hold at least one misconception about coronavirus prevention and treatment, including one in five who say wearing a face mask is harmful to your health and one in four who say hydroxychloroquine is an effective treatment for coronavirus” (Hamel et al. 2020).
a. Hurricane Laura
On 27 August 2020, Hurricane Laura made landfall as a category-4 hurricane in the Lake Charles metropolitan area of western Louisiana (Fig. 1). Hurricane Laura was historically one of the strongest storms—in terms of sustained wind speeds—to make landfall in the Gulf of Mexico with a recorded peak intensity of 150 mi h−1 (67 m s−1) (Neuman 2020). Intense storm surge levels, caused by strong winds and low pressure, penetrated far inland [20–30 n mi (1 n mi = 1.852 km)] from the coast across southwestern Louisiana (and even farther where the surge had inland access through waterways) with a maximum of 18 ft (∼5.5 m) above normal (Pasch et al. 2021). Mandatory and voluntary evacuation orders were placed on many counties in Texas and parishes across Louisiana. More than 1.5 million people evacuated the Gulf Coast ahead of the storm, in what was the largest evacuation to date during the COVID-19 pandemic (Hoskison 2020; Newburger 2020; Shultz et al. 2020).
Maps of the paths of Hurricanes Laura and Sally, with an overlay of population density.
Citation: Weather, Climate, and Society 14, 4; 10.1175/WCAS-D-21-0160.1
Prior to the 2020 hurricane season, Louisiana modified its evacuation and shelter guidelines to include hotels as state-contracted evacuation sites. These noncongregate shelters were prioritized to reduce the risk of a COVID-19 outbreak and almost all Hurricane Laura evacuees were housed in hotels (Knox et al. 2022). Several days before Hurricane Laura made landfall, media reported that 1705 hotel rooms were booked by the state for evacuees (Karlin and Mcauley 2020). The demand for sheltering in hotels quickly outpaced initial estimates requiring the state to identify additional hotel spaces (Knox et al. 2022). Ultimately, more than 21 000 Hurricane Laura evacuees were sheltered in hotels in Louisiana, and more than 5000 people were sheltered in Texas hotels because the state could not find rooms in Louisiana (Louisiana Office of Community Development 2022; O’Donoghue 2020).
There were 47 direct fatalities due to Laura, including 42 drownings and 5 fatalities from falling trees; however, a majority of these deaths occurred in the Caribbean Sea region (Pasch et al. 2021). Of the seven direct fatalities in the United States associated with Hurricane Laura, Pasch et al. (2021) there were four fatalities in Louisiana (one each in the parishes of Acadia, Allen, Jackson, and Vernon), and there was one fatality in Texas in Sabine County. All of these occurred as a result of falling trees. In Corpus Christi, Texas, and Saint George Island, Florida, there were two surf-related drownings. In Louisiana and Texas, an additional 34 indirect fatalities could be attributed to the storm from carbon monoxide poisoning, storm cleanup–related activities, electrocutions, and heat stress, among other indirect causes.
The economic impact to the United States is an estimated $19 billion in damages (Pasch et al. 2021). The impact from both winds and storm surge has substantially damaged the built environment of southwestern Louisiana, especially in Cameron and Calcasieu Parishes where a large percentage of the residential housing sustained major damages. Statements from John Bel Edwards, governor of Louisiana at the time, estimated that 10 000 homes were completely destroyed (Pasch et al. 2021). The year after Hurricane Laura made landfall, 44 538 households received housing assistance and 175 160 insurance claims were filed (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2021; Louisiana Department of Insurance 2021). Additionally, Laura caused more damage to the agricultural sector than both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita combined, causing an estimated $1.6 billion in damage (Advocate Staff 2020).
At the time of landfall, Louisiana had the highest per capita prevalence of COVID-19 cases in the United States, posing additional challenges to mass evacuations (Shultz et al. 2020). However, Laura created adverse conditions for an evolving and complex public health crisis even beyond the issues of COVID-19. The poststorm situation severely damaged water systems and caused widespread power outages, posing threats to health and safety. In addition, a large fire at a chemical plant in Lake Charles, Louisiana, led to shelter-in-place orders and road closures because of environmental health concerns for motorists and nearby residents (Pasch et al. 2021).
b. Hurricane Sally
Approximately 3 weeks later, Hurricane Sally made landfall as a category-2 storm on 16 September 2020, in Gulf Shores, Alabama (Fig. 1). It affected many individuals on the Gulf Coast, specifically those in Alabama and the Florida Panhandle (Berg and Reinhart 2021). This was the first storm to make landfall in Alabama since Hurricane Ivan in 2004 and made landfall in almost the exact location as Ivan (Morgan 2020). Sally had sustained winds of 105 mi h−1 (47 m s−1) at landfall with storm surge peaks between 5 and 7 ft (∼1.5–2.1 m). The greatest impacts from Hurricane Sally came from heavy rainfall, flooding, and tornados (Berg and Reinhart 2021). The highest reported rainfall total from the entire event was 29.99 in. (∼762 mm) at Orange Beach, Alabama, from this slow-moving storm system. This rainfall event was described as “four months of rain in four hours” by a government official in Pensacola, Florida (Chavez and Burnside 2020; Berg and Reinhart 2021). The rainfall was widespread, with Florida also recording 24.88 in. (∼632 mm) just west of Naval Air Station Pensacola. There was significant flooding across portions of southern Alabama and the Florida Panhandle, and evacuations occurred as a result, particularly of those living in low-lying areas and along the coast. Sally resulted in four direct fatalities within the United States (Stevens 2020): two in Florida (Escambia County), one in Alabama (Baldwin County), and one in Georgia (Fulton County). Two of these were related to hazardous marine conditions, one was from storm surge, and one was from gusty winds toppling a tree. Numerous reports also indicate that there were at least five deaths indirectly attributed to Hurricane Sally or that occurred when Sally was no longer a tropical cyclone. Sally caused an estimated $7.3 billion worth of damage (Berg and Reinhart 2021).
The National Hurricane Center openly stated that the formation of Hurricane Sally was not well forecast, and the storm had an erratic track (Berg and Reinhart 2021). Many residents expressed confusion about the real threat of the storm, due in part to the increased risk from it being a slow-moving storm and the variability in predicted landfall location. The storm left over one-half million residents in Alabama, Florida, and Louisiana without electricity (Reuters Staff 2020). Mandatory evacuation orders occurred in Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi at varying points in the evacuation process. This resulted in more than 500 000 people on the Gulf Coast being urged to evacuate prior to Hurricane Sally making landfall (Ames 2020).
2. The COVID-19 pandemic during the 2020 Atlantic hurricane season
a. COVID-19 and evacuations
During the 2020 hurricane season, COVID-19 posed a unique threat to those seeking shelter and mass care, and to those managing and caring for evacuees as hurricane evacuation activities are typically in direct conflict with the needs of pandemic management (Whytlaw et al. 2021). By 25 August 2020, COVID-19 had infected 5.76 million people, leading to 814 000 mortalities across the globe and some 178 000 deaths in the United States (John Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center 2020). An online survey of 7102 Florida residents conducted in June 2020 found that many considered themselves vulnerable to COVID-19; 74.3% felt that using a public shelter was more dangerous than enduring hurricane hazards, and, as a result, many would not utilize a public shelter during a hurricane (Collins et al. 2021).
Such a response should not be surprising. Overcrowded public shelters are widely perceived among laypeople, and known among scientists, to spread infectious aerosolized pathogens. This fear of infection in shelters is not unfounded. Prior research has shown that hurricane evacuations can lead to increased virus transmission if protective measures are not carefully taken (Bissell 1983; Ivers and Ryan 2006; Lemonick 2011; Shultz et al. 2005; Whytlaw et al. 2021). For instance, a norovirus outbreak in a megashelter infected more than 1100 Hurricane Katrina evacuees in 2005 (Shukla et al. 2018). This event was broadly disseminated among media outlets (CNN 2005). Protective measures that can assist and have previously assisted with limiting previous respiratory infections include social distancing, handwashing, increased cleaning, and on-site vaccinations (Lemonick 2011; Liu et al. 2019).
Nevertheless, strong correlations exist between predicted hurricane landfall, storm severity, low-lying areas, and subsequent evacuation rates as well as the nature and durability of housing exposed to hurricane-force winds (Baker 1991, 1995; Gladwin et al. 2001; Whitehead et al. 2000). In addition, individual assessment of their risk of injury and past experiences with hurricanes influence evacuation intentions and are vital in the decision-making process (Demuth et al. 2016; Dow and Cutter 2000). Analysis of social capital and equity has yielded a deeper understanding of vulnerability and evacuation behavior by suggesting many racial and ethnic minorities lack the resources to adequately protect themselves and their families during hurricane landfalls (Eisenman et al. 2007; Elder et al. 2007; Miller 2008; Moore et al. 2004). Racial and ethnic minorities struggle to evaluate hazard risks given disparities in socioeconomic conditions, and cultural, educational, and linguistic barriers (Hutchins et al. 2009). Given these disparities, significant efforts have recently focused on identifying more effective channels of information sharing and synthesis to aid and facilitate more informed decision-making among racial and ethnic minorities (Collins et al. 2017, 2018; Morss et al. 2016; Senkbeil et al. 2012; Sherman-Morris et al. 2011).
Research (Whytlaw et al. 2021) has shown that emergency planners and shelter planners are deeply concerned with ensuring support for those with socioeconomic or health disparities in the COVID-19 pandemic but found that currently utilized initiatives in hurricane evacuations are not inclusive to all groups. Vulnerable and disadvantaged groups are more likely to use shelters, including those of lower socioeconomic status as they do not have the resources for more-desirable alternatives such as a hotel (Greenough et al. 2008; Lindell et al. 2011; Ridpath et al. 2015; Smith and McCarty 2009). Mobile home residents are particularly vulnerable to both hurricanes and tornadoes and represent large numbers of citizens who utilize public shelters. Further, it is important to know how many individuals would plan to evacuate to shelters each hurricane season so emergency planners can ensure a proper amount of sheltering availability (Lindell et al. 2011). A recent survey suggests that careful planning can attenuate COVID-19 risk when using public shelters during tornado warning if strict shelter protocols are followed (Croskery et al. 2021).
During the 2020 hurricane season, COVID-19 vaccinations were not yet available and thus fear of COVID-19 was significant. Certainly, it is generally accepted that individuals engage in more preventive behaviors when threats are perceived as severe and imminent, but this does not seem to be clearly the case with COVID-19. Surveys by both Pakpour and Griffiths (2020) and Harper et al. (2021) revealed that people were fearful, stressed, and anxious about COVID-19, but those feelings did not necessarily translate into adopting preventive measures to reduce their risk of catching COVID-19. Given that nearly all of the U.S. population have no prior experience planning for hurricane evacuations during a pandemic, public health planners needed to rapidly assess the potential societal impacts to anticipate various worse case scenarios (Buckle 2006; Demuth et al. 2012).
Furthermore, individuals had to deal with supply chain disturbances resulting from COVID-19 that could impact their capacity to prepare (Botzen et al. 2021). With these widespread disturbances from COVID-19, individuals who are preparing for a storm may have had harder times getting access to critical emergency supplies like nonperishable food items. Maintaining just-in-time inventory systems, global supply chains, and power networks are critical to local, regional, and global economic conditions, yet these systems remain critically vulnerable to disturbances such as the COVID-19 pandemic (Clark-Ginsberg et al. 2020). Clark-Ginsberg et al. (2020) argue that cascade analysis event tools must be increasingly used to evaluate power load suppression, and subsequent power dispersion due to increased remote work.
b. COVID-19 cases after hurricane landfall
Emergency management experts continue to remind residents to prepare for potential threats regardless of predicted hurricane activity. However, guidance shifted because of the compounding threat of the 2020 hurricane season with the COVID-19 pandemic. A large-scale evacuation during the pandemic could lead to an increase in cases and alter the geographic distribution of COVID-19 infections in both the hurricane affected areas and destination areas of evacuees (Pei et al. 2020).
As mentioned previously, Louisiana was experiencing the highest per capita prevalence of COVID-19 cases across the United States when Hurricane Laura made landfall (Shultz et al. 2020). In the weeks following impact, case positivity rates and hospitalizations increased in areas with heightened population movements because of evacuations, rescue efforts, and an increase in relief efforts (Tracey et al. 2022). Mandatory and voluntary evacuation orders in Texas and Louisiana lead to more than 1.5 million evacuees during Hurricane Laura (Knox et al. 2022). Spikes in positivity rates were often seen in places that were the neighbors to those areas with hurricane-force winds as people evacuated to areas not directly in the path of the hurricane (Tracey et al. 2022). On the other hand, following Hurricane Sally, the positivity rate was much lower as people in general remained home. In fact, Hurricane Sally provided a forced quarantine that mitigated the spread of the virus (Wilkerson 2020).
c. COVID-19 and other disasters
Echoing that preparation and training are everything when it comes to the intersection of COVID-19 and other hazards, Simonovic et al. (2021) argue that adopting a resilience approach is necessary while hazard mitigation measures during COVID-19 must involve planners and the general public. In a surprising discovery, stress levels were not noticeably elevated during the 2020 U.S. western fire season while COVID-19 was raging (Sugg et al. 2022). In 2020, Arizona suffered both record heat-related deaths and record COVID-19 case counts (Austhof and Brown 2021). Not surprisingly, large health jurisdictions remained more flexible and capable in their response because they were able to maintain their capacity to respond to the season of heat-related illness, in part, because they were able to maintain their cross-training approach to health crises (Simonovic et al. 2021).
3. Method
a. Research questions
The research questions addressed in this study include the following: 1) What evacuation decisions did people make when faced with the complex situation of COVID-19 and the 2020 hurricane season? 2) How did COVID-19 (and its associated health vulnerabilities) affect risk perceptions and evacuation decisions of residents? 3) Did people view public shelters as overtly risky, and did they instead choose to shelter in place despite a mandatory evacuation order due to concerns over COVID-19? Prior research (Collins et al. 2020, 2021, 2022) conducted by this team has focused on anticipated evacuation behaviors, but the research shown here reflects actual evacuation decision-making. Because of the unique threat that COVID-19 posed, shelter management considerations went far beyond other cases of infectious diseases during hurricane evacuations. This research, with its blend of logistic- and perception-based questioning, provides officials with information to better understand how evacuation plans change with COVID-19 and how successful these first evacuations were during the COVID-19 pandemic.
b. Survey design
The survey, offered in English and Spanish, was designed to account for the many different scenarios an individual may experience during a 2020 hurricane evacuation. French Creole was considered as a potential survey language; however, past research by this team that included Creole-translated instruments did not result in any survey respondents from this demographic, so it was left out in this project. Because of COVID-19, many individuals evacuated to hotels of their own volition while a large number of people were sent to hotels as part of emergency sheltering by county officials. There were four primary categories, and thus four different survey paths that an individual could classify into were 1) those who evacuated to a shelter, 2) those who evacuated to somewhere other than a hotel (but not to a shelter), 3) those who went to a hotel, and 4) those who stayed at home. In addition, if an individual who evacuated to a shelter was then sent to a hotel, they completed a short series of questions that were not presented to those who stayed in a traditional evacuation shelter (Fig. 2).
The survey logic and its branching paths used in this project.
Citation: Weather, Climate, and Society 14, 4; 10.1175/WCAS-D-21-0160.1
Participants were asked a variety of questions about their risk perceptions in addition to their practical experiences evacuating under these new conditions. The survey addressed questions about their health status and risks, their perceptions of shelters, and how their perceived risks of a hurricane compared with their perceived risks of contracting COVID-19. In addition, practical questions were asked about social distancing and COVID-19 measures they experienced while staying in a hotel or shelter along with improvements that could be made for future evacuations. The survey instrument was designed with a team of emergency managers, planners, and other government officials to ensure the questions were of use to their planning and response efforts. Initially, the survey contained 196 items but was later shortened to 146 because of a high dropout rate of participants toward the end of questioning. Each path contained approximately 80 questions, with those who stayed at home having the shortest questionnaire and those who went to a shelter that then sent them to a hotel being the longest (see the online supplemental material).
c. Distribution
The anonymous surveys were conducted digitally using the Qualtrics platform. Because of the effects of memory decay, which can alter the accuracy with which one can recall an event (Stallings 2002), and the potential for perceptions and thoughts to change over time (Baker 1979, 1991; Lindell et al. 2005), the survey was deployed immediately after Hurricanes Laura and Sally made landfall, and many of the respondents completed the survey at that time. Available in both English and Spanish, the survey was then available from September 2020 until February 2021 to any resident over the age of 18 in the areas affected by Hurricanes Sally or Laura. The participants were selected using convenience and snowball sampling techniques. The distribution of this survey occurred through many professional avenues created by the research team, such as the Louisiana Public Health Institute, Tulane University, the New Orleans Mayor’s Office, emergency management, and various news media platforms such as local news affiliates from ABC and Fox. The survey was made available on web pages, news stories, Facebook groups created by those affected by the disaster, and on various social media platforms including Twitter and LinkedIn. In addition, brief data reports summarizing the preliminary survey results were made public to ensure emergency managers had the tools they needed during future tropical cyclones in the 2020 season such as Delta and Eta.
d. Analysis
Data were downloaded from Qualtrics and imported into IBM SPSS, version 26, to be cleaned, categorized, and organized as needed for statistical analyses. Short-answer questions were categorized by topic for analysis purposes. Because many of the survey questions were categorical or ordinal in nature, nonparametric testing (such as chi-squared and McNemar’s tests) and simple frequencies were primarily used for analysis. In addition, t tests and ANOVAs were used when relevant. Although analysis was performed comparing many demographic groups with different variables of interest, only those of statistical significance are presented in the following section.
4. Results
a. Demographics of sample
A total of 1034 valid responses were received, with 163 and 871 participants representing Hurricane Laura and Hurricane Sally, respectively. Because of considerable drop-off in respondent participation partway through the survey, each survey question presented here may vary in the number of respondents. The majority of respondents took the survey in English (97.9%). Because of the comparatively small number of responses received for Hurricane Laura (further discussed in the limitations section), both surveys were combined into one final dataset representing actual evacuation behavior in the 2020 hurricane season from these two hurricanes for analyses. Respondents ranged from 18 to 86 years of age, with an average age of 49 years. The average household size was 2.89 individuals, with 68.4% of people having a household between one and three members. The overwhelming majority of respondents (90.0%) self-identified as white. See Table 1 for a further demographic summary.
Summary of demographics. Here, M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation, respectively, N represents the number of individuals, and the percent is equivalent to the percent of respondents from the sample population as a whole.
Relative to the South Region of the U.S. Census (U.S. Census Bureau 2020a,b), the sample from this study had a higher percentage of women (74.6% vs 50.3%), less racial diversity (with 90% identifying as white vs 58.5%), and higher income (with an average household income between $80,000 and $90,000 vs $59,816) and was generally skewed older than the average age of the South Region population. The sample had higher-than-average rates of high school completion (99.3% vs 21.6%) but lower-than-average graduates with a bachelor’s degree or higher (9.1% vs 21.5%).
For respondents’ geographic representations, there were individuals in 56 unique counties and 135 zip codes from across the Gulf States. For Hurricane Laura, the largest percentage of respondents (65.3%) were from Calcasieu Parish; the highest areas of response for Hurricane Sally were Baldwin (37.6%) and Santa Rosa (35.5%) Counties.
b. Evacuation decisions
Only 12.4% of the group identified that they were under a mandatory evacuation order for Hurricanes Laura or Sally, 83.5% were not, and 4.2% did not know if they were. In general, 76.8% of the sample stayed at home, 0.9% went to a shelter and stayed in a shared space with other evacuees, 6.4% went to a hotel or motel (paid for by themselves or someone else), and 15.8% evacuated their home and did not go to a shelter (stayed with a friend, stayed in a vehicle, etc.). A small portion (18.1%) stated that the category of the hurricane based on the Saffir–Simpson hurricane wind scale does not affect their decision to evacuate. A very small percentage (0.8%) of the sample stated that they tried to evacuate to a shelter but had something that occurred that made them unable to do so. Those who identified that they were under a mandatory evacuation order were statistically more likely to choose to evacuate [X2(2) = 181.783; p < 0.001], with 85.5% of people who were not under a mandatory order choosing to stay at home as compared with only 25.7% who were.
For those who evacuated to a shelter, hotel, or elsewhere, 70.4% evacuated to somewhere outside their county of residence. Some individuals (18.9%) stated that they had to leave their place of shelter after Hurricane Laura or Sally made landfall due to reasons such as loss of electricity, flooding, or other damages. Many of these individuals (63.9%) evacuated to the home of a friend or family member or to a hotel (20.3%).
There was a statistically significant difference [X2(4) = 225.808; p < 0.0001] in evacuation behaviors in Hurricanes Laura and Sally (see Table 2). In Hurricane Sally, 85.6% stayed at home. For Hurricane Laura, fewer individuals stayed at home (26.4%). Approximately 4% of Laura evacuees went to a shelter, 25.6% went to a hotel or motel, and 44.0% evacuated their home but did not go to a shelter. Additionally, evacuation decisions were significantly different based on the self-identified political affiliation of an individual [X2(12) = 22.291; p = 0.034] with Republican respondents being the most likely to have stayed at home. Of note is that political affiliation and household income had no significant relationship.
Summary of evacuation decisions seen in Hurricanes Sally and Laura; N represents the number of individuals.
Respondents were asked if they had ever performed any protective actions in past hurricanes. Half (50.7%) of respondents identified that they stayed at home during past hurricanes, 4% stated that they went to a shelter, 43.4% have evacuated their home, and a quarter (25.2%) have never experienced an evacuation order before (Table 3).
Summary of prior evacuation experiences of respondents; N represents the number of individuals; respondents could select multiple answers to this question.
For preparedness, approximately 68.6% of respondents had an evacuation plan and 59% had a disaster kit before the impact of Hurricanes Laura or Sally. Approximately one-half (46.6%) of participants owned a generator. For those who owned a generator, 41.3% found that having a generator influenced their decision to stay at home, whereas, for those that did not own one, 37.7% stated that it affected their decision to evacuate.
When asked, “Do you use the category of a hurricane to make your decision to evacuate? If so, what is the lowest category you would evacuate for?,” the distinction of becoming a major storm (category 3 or above) played a large role in their decision to evacuate. Among the respondents, 6.3% said they would evacuate at a category 1, 19.7% said they would evacuate at a category 2, 45.7% said they would evacuate at a category 3, 8.7% said they would evacuate at a category 4, and 1.6% said they would evacuate at a category 5.
c. Specific hazard concerns
A third (35.6%) of respondents lived in a flood or evacuation zone at the time of Hurricane Laura or Sally. The majority (80.2%) of the total sample were homeowners and 9% of respondents lived in mobile homes (whether they rented or owned). Many respondents (58.7%) experienced damage to their homes during the event; those who experienced Hurricane Laura had a significantly higher rate of damage (78.6%) than those in Sally (55.6%) [X2(2) = 26.452; p < 0.0001].
Participants were asked to rate how concerned they were about specific hazards at their residence on a Likert scale from “extremely concerned” at 4 to “not concerned” at 0 (Table 4). Respondents were most concerned about wind speed (N = 877;
Average respondent score for the question, “Please rate how concerned you are about the following hazards at your residence”; N, and SD are used to represent the number of survey responses and standard deviation. The mean score is based on a scale from 0 to 4, with 0 representing “not concerned” and 4 representing “extremely concerned.”
d. COVID-19 and health
Respondents were asked to provide relevant health information and identify their perceived COVID-19 weaknesses and other factors relating to their health. When asked about the current COVID-19 status for their county at the time of Hurricane Laura or Sally, the majority (51.5%) were under a stay-at-home recommendation only. Of note is that 17.7% did not know their COVID-19 restrictions. The majority (89.2%) of respondents were insured under at least one private or public health insurance program. Only 6.6% identified that they had no insurance or that they did not know their health insurance status.
Approximately one-third of respondents (34.9%) considered themselves more vulnerable to COVID-19 because of preexisting health risks. When asked, “How serious would it be if you or someone in your household were to get COVID-19?,” 35.2% stated it would be very serious, 45.9% stated it would be somewhat serious, and 17.2% stated it would be not at all serious. When asked if they or anyone in their household has been diagnosed with a health condition that would put them at greater risk of COVID-19 (or make them eligible for special needs shelters, such as electricity dependence), 30.1% of respondents identified at least one disease from the list. Approximately 10% (9.7%) of the sample had identified at least two comorbidities. There was no statistical connection between evacuation decisions and perceived COVID-19 vulnerability.
Most individuals (69.9%) identified that they wore masks almost always during their evacuation experience; 13% identified that they never wore masks. When asking about COVID-19 status near Hurricanes Laura or Sally, 4.4% had family members test positive prior to Hurricane Sally (with 10.5% of those individuals testing positive within 2 weeks of the event), 56.6% did not know or did not test, and 37.6% received negative results from their COVID-19 test prior to the event.
e. Public shelter perceptions
When asked the question, “Prior to COVID-19, if I needed to evacuate to a shelter during hurricane season, I would most likely have done so,” 5.1% stated definitely true, 8.8% stated probably true, 27.1% stated probably false, and 59% stated definitely false. When posed the question, “Considering the current situation with COVID-19, I would still go to a shelter if I needed to during a hurricane evacuation order in 2020,” 3.9% stated definitely true, 7.7% stated probably true, 24.7% stated probably false, and 63.8% stated definitely false (Table 5). When comparing anticipated shelter usage before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, it decreased by 2.1%. This was a statistically significant decrease in potential shelter usage (p < 0.0001) as determined through a McNemar’s test. All respondents were asked to answer a series of Likert-scale questions addressing their perceptions and feelings about shelters and their COVID-19 risk during Hurricanes Sally and Laura. These questions reflect a negative perception of public shelters despite the high potential for shelter usage. When asked, “Prior to Hurricane Sally approaching, I felt that the risks of being in a shelter during the COVID-19 pandemic would be worse than staying at home and enduring the risks of a hurricane (e.g., storm surge, strong winds, etc.),” 62.5% of individuals found this to be probably or definitely true. When asked, “I think if I went to a shelter, there would have been adequate safety measures in place to keep me safe from COVID-19, such as being able to social distance at least 6 ft. apart,” 48.1% of individuals found this to be probably or definitely true (Table 5). Additionally, when asked, “As Hurricane Sally/Laura approached, I felt I would rather stay at home than risk being exposed to a potentially large group inside a shelter,” 64.1% of people found this to be probably or definitely true. When participants were asked the question, “Now, after Hurricane Sally/Laura made landfall, I feel the same about the risks of a shelter during the COVID-19 pandemic,” 55.6% of respondents felt it was definitely true, 31.2% felt it was probably true, 6% felt it was probably false, and 7.3% felt it was definitely false (Table 5). There was no significant difference in this question between the different evacuation decisions.
Summary of Likert-scale responses to statements about public shelters during the COVID-19 pandemic; N is used to represent the number of survey responses.
f. Perceptions of those who stayed in a hotel
The majority of individuals who used hotels either paid for it themselves or a member of their household paid (76.5%). Family members and friends paid 9.8%, and 5.9% of individuals had their hotel costs covered by a nonprofit or government agency. Only 9.4% of individuals were sent to a hotel from a central location such as a processing center or public shelter.
For transportation, 84.6% of respondents took a personal vehicle to get to the hotel. The majority of individuals who evacuated to a hotel (72%) had pets at the time of Hurricane Laura or Sally, and 84.2% of these pet owners found that they could take their pet with them to the hotel. For those that could not bring their pet with them, only one stated that they were barred by the hotel from bringing their pet inside despite it being an evacuation.
The majority of the sample definitely agreed (68.6%) or somewhat agreed (17.6%) that staff and guests wore masks while in the common spaces of the hotel. For social distancing, 66.7% of respondents definitely agreed and 27.5% somewhat agreed that staff and guests practiced social distancing in common areas. The majority of individuals who used a hotel stated that no one in their parties was symptomatic (96.2%). Additionally, 80% of respondents did not find that someone in their household was isolated from others due to being more at-risk for COVID-19. Almost all individuals found that no one in their house had COVID-19 symptoms within 14 days following the storm. However, within 14 days following Hurricane Laura or Sally, 7.8% found that a member of their household tested positive for COVID-19.
g. Perceptions of those who stayed at home
Three-fourths of the sample (76.7%) stayed at home during Hurricane Laura or Sally. When asked if COVID-19 was the reason they stayed at home, 5.3% said definitely, 81.3% said somewhat, and 13.2% said not at all. This reflects the partial role that COVID-19 played in balancing an individual’s protective action decision-making during this complex disaster. Of those surveyed, 15.5% stated that they wanted to evacuate but waited until they felt it was too late.
For those who stayed home, 80% had a pet; 44.1% of those pet owners’ decisions to stay home were influenced by their pet. Almost all (96.7%) of those who stayed at home did not do so because of a lack of transportation. Of the survey participants, 9.1% identified that they chose not to evacuate to stay and take care of someone who could not or would not leave. When asked, “If I wanted to evacuate, I could have found friends or family to give me shelter in my county,” 60.9% stated it was definitely or probably true. When asked the same question about connections outside their county, 87.2% answered it to be true.
h. Perceptions of those who evacuated elsewhere
Those who evacuated elsewhere most often stayed with a friend (58.5%) or coworker (13.8%). Almost all individuals evacuated to their alternate destination using a personal vehicle (98.4%). The majority of participants (85%) stated that COVID-19 was not the primary reason they chose to evacuate to somewhere other than a shelter. Some individuals (8.1%) had to change their alternate shelter location partway through the process due to the storm or other hazards. Almost three-quarters (73.2%) of people had a pet at the time of Hurricane Laura or Sally, and of those pet owners, a quarter (27.3%) stated that their pet affected their decision not to go to a shelter. Nearly every participant identified that no one in their house had symptoms of COVID-19 in the two weeks prior to the storm’s impact. However, 7.1% of people found that they or someone in their household tested positive for COVID-19 within this window.
i. Sources of information
When asked, “Do you feel you were provided enough information to make a good evacuation decision?,” 39.8% said definitely, 56.4% said somewhat, and 3.6% said not at all. There was not a significant difference between those who experienced Hurricanes Laura or Sally in regard to this question. Respondents were asked to rank the sources of information they relied on during Hurricane Laura or Sally on a Likert scale ranging from “not relied on at all” at 1 to “most relied on” at 5 (Table 6). The most relied on sources of information were local media (N = 798;
Sources of information upon which individuals relied when making prior hurricane evacuation decisions; N and SD are used to represent number of survey responses and standard deviation. The mean score is based on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being “more likely to rely upon” when making prior hurricane evacuation decisions.
5. Discussion
a. Summary
The majority of survey participants affected by Hurricanes Laura and Sally chose to stay at home (76.8%). However, 80% of those individuals who stayed at home stated that this was somewhat attributable to COVID-19 concerns. This reflects the partial role that COVID-19 played in balancing an individual’s protective action decision-making during this complex disaster. This is in line with prior research done by Botzen et al. (2021) that showed that individuals’ primary concerns and obstacles preventing them from evacuation were COVID-19 in the 2020 hurricane season. For additional hurricane hazards, respondents were most concerned about wind speed, wind gusts, and the category of the storm. Respondents were least concerned about storm surge, tornadoes, and the size of the storm. Since several of the respondents lived inland, this result of less concern with storm surge makes sense as storm surge locally affects coastal communities, though it does affect those living along some inland waterways. The most relied on sources of information were local media and electronic media. The least relied on sources were print media and family/friends far away. Of note is that 15.5% stated that they wanted to evacuate but waited until they felt it was too late. For those individuals who chose to go to a hotel, who for the majority paid for it themselves, many found that staff and guests wore masks and were socially distanced in common spaces of the hotel. The majority of those who evacuated to somewhere other than a shelter (85%) stated that COVID-19 was not the primary reason they chose to evacuate to somewhere other than a shelter. Many individuals considered themselves to be vulnerable to COVID-19 (39.4%), and approximately two-thirds of the sample believed that if they or their loved ones caught COVID-19 it would be “very serious.” However, this perceived vulnerability had no significant impact on actual evacuation decision-making.
b. Shelter perceptions
Prior research into the concept of administrative burden has shown that individuals, when deciding to partake in public programs such as shelters, will weigh the costs of getting that service with the benefits given from it (Connolly et al. 2021; Herd and Moynihan 2018). With the added barriers presented by COVID-19, more individuals may find that the benefits of going to a shelter for protection no longer outweigh the costs of exposure in a shelter. This idea was supported by the fact that a significant number of individuals that would have considered using a public shelter in the past no longer would during the COVID-19 pandemic, with anticipated shelter usage decreasing by 2.1%. This was a statistically significant decrease in potential shelter usage (p < 0.0001), reflecting that shelter usage, although rarely utilized by most individuals, has the potential to decrease when coupled with COVID-19 threats. However, this decrease in shelter usage is lower than seen in previous work by Collins et al. (2020, 2021), reflecting that people’s attitudes potentially changed further on into the course of the pandemic.
In addition, people have developed a negative perception of public shelters and their ability to protect them from COVID-19, instead favoring staying at home in potentially hazardous situations during a hurricane. Even with the experiences of Hurricane Laura or Sally, almost 90% of the sample still holds the same perceptions of shelters as before. This is in line with pre-evacuation results from Collins et al. (2020, 2021, 2022) where negative shelter perceptions were also seen. This decrease in shelter usage is of concern for emergency management officials as individuals may be choosing to stay at home at the risk of experiencing hurricane hazards due to a fear of COVID-19, which could potentially lead to an increased loss of life among those who would have previously used a shelter—the most vulnerable or disadvantaged members of our population, such as those with low income, the elderly, and those with disabilities (Greenough et al. 2008; Lindell et al. 2011; Ridpath et al. 2015; Smith and McCarty 2009). Individuals who are older are of further concern as prior research has shown that they are especially vulnerable in the hurricane seasons that overlap with the COVID-19 pandemic due to a hesitancy to evacuate voluntarily for fear of infection or increased COVID-19 risks (Botzen et al. 2021; Collins et al. 2021).
c. Differences between Hurricanes Sally and Laura
As shown in Table 2, significantly more people chose to stay at home for Hurricane Sally than for Hurricane Laura. Hurricane Sally, generally, had less variance in evacuation choices with 85.6% of individuals staying at home, 3.1% going to a hotel, and 11% evacuating elsewhere. During Hurricane Laura, more individuals evacuated elsewhere (44.0%) and went to hotels (25.6%), with fewer people staying at home (26.4%). These differences in evacuation choice can likely be attributed to the severity difference between the two storms, respondents’ prior hurricane experience, and the communications campaign utilized.
For Hurricane Laura, many news outlets were encouraging evacuation due to the anticipated severity and this heightened severity is displayed through the higher rate of housing damage experienced by the survey participants in Hurricane Laura. In Hurricane Sally, many people stated in the comments of this survey that they felt that the storm caught them off guard due to its variable path and rapid intensification. Due to this, many people may not have had the ability to evacuate until it was too late. This is supported by the fact that more people said that they wanted to evacuate but waited until it was too late during Hurricane Sally (15.7%) relative to Hurricane Laura (11.1%). Further, those who experienced Hurricane Laura were more likely to have had any sort of prior evacuation experience (10.4% stated they had no prior evacuation experience for Laura vs 28.0% for Sally), and many more people had previously evacuated their homes (52.8% vs 41.7%) or went to a shelter in the past (6.7% vs 3.4%).
d. Limitations
One critical limitation of the research is the underrepresentation of those who experienced Hurricane Laura. The research team believes this disparity in responses arose from how quickly we distributed the survey postlandfall for Hurricane Laura. Because of its damage, many individuals were left without power and other basic necessities and thus did not have the physical or emotional capacity to participate in this survey. Even though we left it open until February, many residents were still experiencing limited electricity availability, widespread damage, and having to reside in temporary shelter while their homes were being repaired. An additional limitation is that there was limited representation from those who sheltered, leading to the unusability of certain shelter-specific practical questions. As stated previously, our sample is unrepresentative of the hurricane-prone coastal communities in the southeastern United States, which could limit the generalizability of this research. The team can attribute that to the method of sampling, which, although not ideal for representation, is effective for disaster research (Norris 2006). Because of the limitations of the COVID-19 pandemic, in-person surveying was not an option, and all surveying had to be conducted digitally, limiting the responses to those who had access to technology and the internet. Future research will be highlighting the qualitative comments from this survey for further insight into Hurricanes Laura and Sally as case studies.
6. Conclusions
Hurricanes Laura and Sally provide interesting case studies for evacuation during the COVID-19 pandemic. Laura, a more damaging storm with a higher evacuation rate, provided insight into how people made decisions under high-stakes disaster scenarios during the COVID-19 pandemic. Hurricane Sally, on the other hand, showed decision-making with a lesser impactful storm with a highly uncertain and evolving forecast. Despite the limited sample reached in this study, some general observations can be made. Respondents in this survey were least concerned about storm surge, a potentially severe factor, while showing high concern for factors such as the category of the storm. Future communications, ideally on local media and electronic media sources, should aim to emphasize the risks of all hurricane-related hazards, in particular water hazards that can be severe even if the category of a storm is low.
Many individuals felt that it would be very serious if they or their loved ones caught COVID-19, and 39.4% stated that they considered themselves vulnerable to COVID-19 because of preexisting health risks. However, this perceived vulnerability had no impact on actual evacuation decision-making. Additionally, people have developed a negative perception of public shelters and their ability to protect them during the COVID-19 pandemic, instead favoring staying at home in potentially hazardous situations during a hurricane. Of importance is that many individuals who would have previously considered using a shelter would no longer do so during the COVID-19 pandemic, but that this decrease is lower than what was seen in previous work from earlier in the pandemic, reflecting that people’s attitudes potentially changed farther on into the course of the pandemic. This is critical information for emergency planners not only with regard to the necessary number of shelters but also when planning support for the vulnerable populations that would previously rely on shelters but would not during the pandemic.
This research provides a foundational knowledge to the actual evacuation behaviors seen during the COVID-19 pandemic and addressed not only how these evacuations were perceived but also logistically how well they functioned. Emergency management agencies can use the information found in this study to increase inclusivity of future hurricane evacuation measures and communications with consideration to COVID-19 to reach as many vulnerable groups as possible as this was previously lacking (Whytlaw et al. 2021). The results presented here have been used and will continue to be used by emergency managers to inform future evacuation planning and management.
Acknowledgments.
We acknowledge critical collaborators to this project’s success, including those who assisted with translation services: Andrea Tristán, Antonio Piñero Crespo, and Carmen Crespo. In addition, we acknowledge the support of NSF’s Human-Environment and Geographical Sciences (HEGS) Program (NSF Award: 2052268) as well as the NSF Research Experience for Undergraduate program in “Weather, Climate and Society” [NSF Award: 1659754 (principal investigators: author Collins and R. Ersing)] that helped to provide training for the student authors on this study. We also acknowledge Dr. Stephen Murphy, director of the Disaster Management Program at Tulane University, for his feedback and input on the survey instruments and distribution. We thank student volunteers for their feedback and assistance with piloting these surveys in Spanish and English. Additional thanks are given to the people in the field of emergency management who provided feedback on the survey instrument before and during distribution. We also thank those from numerous fields, including broadcast meteorology, emergency management, and other fields, who assisted with disseminating the survey.
Data availability statement.
The raw dataset is not available, but summarized data reports are available oneline (https://doi.org/10.17603/ds2-ry5r-a653). The hurricane data were from the National Hurricane Center’s North Atlantic hurricane database as archived in the International Best Track Archive for Climate Stewardship, version 4 (IBTrACS; https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/ibtracs/). Population data at the county level as of 2020–21 were from the U.S. Census Bureau (https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2020s-counties-total.html).
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