1) Perceptions of risk prior to Ike

On the basis of the information they received about Hurricane Ike before the storm, about three-quarters of interviewees (36) reported believing that their property might be at risk. About two-thirds (31) believed that they or their family might be at risk. Thus, most interviewees understood that Ike posed a risk. About 20% (9), however, reported perceiving neither personal nor property risk.

The 40 interviewees who perceived either personal or property risk were asked about what risks they were worried. Most responses focused on threats to personal safety or property due to flooding and/or wind. Approximately 20% (8) said that they were worried about both flooding and damaging winds, and a similar number (9) said they were worried primarily about flooding. More than one-quarter (11) said they were worried primarily about damaging wind. A number of respondents mentioned that they never expected the flooding to be so bad. For example, one interviewee said that she never dreamed of 7 ft of water (in her neighborhood); another said the storm surge caught her by surprise. Thus, while some of our respondents knew Ike could cause flooding in their area, a substantial portion did not.

2) Harm experienced because of Ike

The extent of the flooding and resulting damage was worse than many interviewees’ pre-Ike perceptions of risk. Nearly all (47 of the 49) interviewees, including all of those in Galveston, experienced property damage to their homes because of Hurricane Ike.² Although a few reported only cosmetic damage, the vast majority of interviewees reported extensive damage to their residences and other property, especially from flooding. One Kemah interviewee’s house had been moved 6 m (20 ft) off its foundation; another said that a pier ended up in his living room. A number of Galveston interviewees discussed how flooding destroyed everything (including furniture, appliances, sheetrock, and wiring) below a certain height inside their homes; a few lost everything. Two Galveston interviewees who incurred only minor damage mentioned that their homes had been raised about 2.1 m (7 ft) after the 1900 hurricane, which protected their main floor from flooding.

Ike caused deaths and injuries, and hurricanes pose significant threats to personal safety for at-risk coastal residents who do not evacuate. Nevertheless, for our interviewees, the most common threats to personal well-being (after property damage and financial harm) were not death or injury, but trauma or other issues related to long-term recovery. About one-quarter of interviewees (12) reported that they or their families experienced harm because of Hurricane Ike. Two of these experienced minor injuries, but the most common harm mentioned was emotional or psychological, reported by six interviewees. Other types of harm included lost jobs and pets. A few interviewees also mentioned concerns about personal and community economic recovery. One interviewee’s story illustrates the complex aftermath of an event such as Ike. Her family had evacuated, and they returned to find that their apartment had been inundated by floodwaters and their belongings were covered in mud and mold. Although the interviewee had washed the clothes they left behind multiple times, one of her children still developed rashes from wearing them. At the time of our interview, the family was living in a temporary tent city set up by the American Red Cross, but the shelter was scheduled to close soon, and she did not know where they would then live.

3) Concern about future hurricane threats

About 40% (21) of interviewees said that their concern about threats from future hurricanes had changed since Hurricane Ike. When asked how their concern had changed, many said that they were more scared, particularly about flooding or storm surge. For example, one woman said that she had lived in Texas her whole life but found the amount of damage caused by Ike’s surge terrifying. Another said that after seeing Ike’s damage, she no longer felt safe in her own home during a hurricane. One of the nonevacuees (who ended up wading through chest-high water to seek shelter at a neighbor’s elevated house) mentioned that he would pay attention to the size of the next storm; if one as big as Ike comes, he would leave. Of those who said that their concerns about future hurricane threats had not changed, several explained that they had lived in the area a long time and so they knew what hurricanes could do. However, another long-time Galveston resident noted that she had a misconception about hurricanes; she did not think a category 2 storm would cause this much damage. These findings illustrate some of the ways that experience with a damaging hurricane can affect people’s perceptions of future hurricane risk.

1) Preparation decisions

Ninety percent of interviewees said they or someone else prepared their residences for Hurricane Ike in advance of the storm. One of the five who reported not preparing specifically for Ike said that he was always ready; another said that his home’s windows were designed to withstand significant impact. Nevertheless, all five who did not prepare experienced significant damage, mostly from flooding. This further supports the discussion in section 3a that some people did not perceive the extent of the risk posed by Ike, particularly from flooding.

To add detail to previous discussions of people’s hurricane preparation decisions (e.g., Lindell et al. 2001, 2005), we asked people what was done to prepare their residences (see also Zhang et al. 2007). Of those who prepared, nearly all reported preparing for strong winds, for example, by boarding or shuttering windows and picking up loose items. About one-quarter prepared for potential flooding by moving household items or vehicles to higher ground, although several noted that they did or could not move property high enough. Other preparations included turning off appliances, electricity, and gas; purchasing supplies; preparing for power outages; and moving or securing important records or valuables. The overall level of preparedness suggests that our interviewees were generally aware of the risks to property posed by hurricane-force winds. However, the ways that interviewees prepared, again, suggests that some were not aware of the coastal flood risk associated with hurricanes in general and Hurricane Ike in particular.

2) Evacuation decisions

Other than preparing their residences, a major way that people can lower their risk from an approaching hurricane is to go somewhere safer. One interviewee was not in the Texas Gulf coast region when Hurricane Ike approached, and four owned homes in both Houston and Galveston and chose to ride out the storm in their Houston homes. Of the remaining 44 interviewees, about three-quarters (34) evacuated. When asked the main reason why they decided to leave, 7 of the 34 evacuees (about 20%) said it was because of an evacuation order. Eight discussed their concern about the storm’s danger or fear for their safety, and five said they left because of children or elderly parents. Seven discussed forecasts, warnings, or the storm’s characteristics. Three said they evacuated primarily because someone else convinced them to do so. Several interviewees also mentioned intrahousehold discussions on whether and when to evacuate, corroborating earlier findings on the importance of household interactions in decision making (e.g., Gladwin and Peacock 1997; Gladwin et al. 2001). Other reasons for evacuating included not being a risk taker, not wanting to be alone during the storm, and seeing environmental cues such as water rising as the storm approached.

These results agree with previous findings that evacuation orders are an important influence on some people’s evacuation decisions, but that many people consider other information—including forecasts, expected effects, and other people’s opinions—when evaluating their risk and deciding on appropriate action (Baker 1979, 1991, 1995; Dow and Cutter 1998, 2000; Gladwin et al. 2001; Lindell et al. 2005; Dash and Gladwin 2007; Zhang et al. 2007). This suggests that for many people, effective communication of forecasts and potential effects is important. For example, several interviewees reported hearing forecasts of potentially devastating storm surge and using that information in their decision making.

The 10 nonevacuees gave a variety of reasons for staying. Three discussed the elevation of their residence, its storm protection features, or their experience and confidence in the Galveston seawall, suggesting that they felt Ike posed limited risk to them. One of these three resided in a high-rise condominium complex that experienced only minor damage; the other two experienced substantial flooding in their homes and traumatizing or life-threatening situations. Another nonevacuee said he stayed because he said he always does, except for category 5 storms; he noted that category 2 storms (such as Ike) do not produce much wind damage. Although this man described his experience with Ike’s flooding as potentially life threatening, he did not seem to regret staying. Three nonevacuees had a large number of pets and discussed the difficulty of transporting them and finding shelter.³ Another nonevacuee was concerned that his older car would break down en route, given his experience with traffic jams during the Hurricane Rita evacuation. Other reasons for not evacuating included protecting personal and business property, job responsibilities, insufficient funds, a child with health issues that made evacuation difficult, not wanting to drive 8 h to a relative’s house, and past experience with hurricanes. A few of these nonevacuees also experienced traumatic or dangerous situations during Ike. These results are consistent with earlier findings on why some people do not evacuate when a hurricane threatens (e.g., Baker 1991; Dow and Cutter 1998; Riad et al. 1999; Gladwin et al. 2001; Zhang et al. 2007). Further, they highlight how some nonevacuees did not fully understand the risk posed by Ike: they found themselves in hazardous, frightening situations when it was too late to evacuate.

While evacuation decisions are sometimes viewed or modeled as one-time yes–no decisions, in reality, they are often complex and evolving. As discussed in Gladwin and Peacock (1997) and Gladwin et al. (2001), our data indicate that risk perception, experience, evacuation orders, forecasts, environmental cues, household interactions, and resources and constraints can all interact over a period of time as people decide whether to evacuate, when, and how. This is illustrated by the story of one nonevacuee we interviewed, a lifelong Galveston resident who has stayed for a number of hurricanes. Because the interviewee’s area had not flooded in his lifetime and his home’s main floor is elevated, he did not anticipate flooding despite the forecasts. However, the warnings concerned his teenage daughter, and she and his girlfriend convinced him to evacuate. They packed to leave, but he had only $50 and was unable to obtain additional cash because banks were already closed and no one else would cash his two-party paycheck. He also anticipated difficulty finding a hotel to stay in with his five pit bulls. His family said that if he stayed, they would stay, so he purchased supplies and they all stayed. Although their main floor did not flood, the man had to rescue his dogs from the first-floor garage, and he and his family suffered emotional trauma from experiencing the storm.

To examine in more detail how different types of considerations influence people’s decisions, we asked interviewees to what extent they relied on 1) recommendations of authorities; 2) their own judgment; and 3) family or friends’ judgment when making evacuation decisions related to Hurricane Ike (Fig. 4).⁴ Most interviewees reported relying heavily on their own judgment, although this may have arisen in part because independent judgment is a socially desirable response. A smaller number of interviewees reported relying heavily on authorities’ recommendations or family or friends’ judgment. On average, family and friends’ judgment was approximately as important as authorities’ recommendations, which is consistent with previous disaster research (e.g., Lindell and Perry 2004). Further, Fig. 4 indicates that individuals’ responses tended to be on the extremes of the scale. This suggests that, as discussed earlier, different people weight information differently when making evacuation decisions. It also means that many interviewees can be categorized by their reliance on certain considerations over others.⁵ Such findings may have implications for designing hurricane risk message content and dissemination strategies.

3) Evacuation orders

Because evacuation orders are important for some people’s decisions, we were interested in how effectively such orders are communicated. When asked if officials had issued an evacuation order for their location for Ike, 40 interviewees said a mandatory order had been issued, and 7 said a voluntary order. One said no evacuation order had been issued, and one did not know. Six of those who said there was a voluntary order and the one who did not know resided in Galveston. A mandatory evacuation order was issued for all of Galveston Island prior to Ike, but not until Thursday, 11 September—later than officials’ plans to order evacuations 72 h before landfall (Houston Chronicle, 11 September 2008). On Wednesday evening, a mandatory order had been issued for the western portion of the island, but evacuation on the eastern end (including the town of Galveston) was voluntary. This delay in issuing the evacuation order and the change in location appears to have confused some interviewees. Several thought evacuation was mandatory only for the west end, and two reported not hearing the mandatory order for the east end until hours after it was issued. This corroborates the discussion in Lindell et al. (2007) that timely issuance of evacuation orders is important, not only to give people time to travel to safety, but also to give people enough time to hear the information, decide to leave, and make necessary preparations. Three of the Galveston nonevacuees thought that they were under only a voluntary evacuation order; the remaining five knew the order was mandatory and stayed anyway.

We asked those who said they were under an evacuation order how they heard about it. More than half of the respondents reported hearing about the evacuation order on television (cable or local). The next most common source was radio, followed by their community’s reverse-911 system and other people. One interviewee described being in the grocery store to purchase supplies and hearing people discussing the evacuation order on cell phones. Others received the information from the Internet, their workplace, or police driving by with loudspeakers. Thus, while the majority of interviewees heard about the evacuation order through the news media, overall, a diverse set of sources was used. Corroborating the discussion in Phillips and Morrow (2007) and Cutter and Smith (2009), these findings suggest the importance of disseminating such information multiple ways, so it reaches a wide audience as quickly as possible.

The relatively late issuance of evacuation orders combined with the relatively early arrival of flooding due to Ike’s size meant that mandatory evacuation orders were not issued for Galveston Island until 24–36 h before flooding began. Because evacuation orders are one cue to members of the public that a dangerous hurricane is threatening, we asked interviewees if they had enough time after receiving the evacuation order to do what they needed to do to protect themselves and their property. About 70% said yes. Several of those said that they had enough time only because they started preparing before the evacuation order was issued, based on experience or information they received on the news. This is consistent with Dow and Cutter’s (2002) data indicating that in Hurricane Floyd, many South Carolina residents evacuated or prepared to do so before a mandatory evacuation order was issued. It also highlights the importance of effectively communicating information other than evacuation orders—including forecasts of the storm and discussions of its possible effects—to help people prepare for an approaching hurricane.

Several interviewees said they did not have enough time to prepare their property, and several reported not having enough time to move belongings to a safe location. Three attributed this to uncertainty in the storm track, suggesting the potential value of improving hurricane forecasts. One noted the trade-off between spending more time preparing and leaving so late that one gets caught in traffic or cannot evacuate because of flooded roads. As discussed earlier, this indicates that people at risk must decide not only whether to evacuate but also when and how.

4) Learning from experience

Given that many people experienced more significant flooding than they expected, we asked interviewees whether, looking back on their decisions as Hurricane Ike approached the coast, they would do anything differently next time, and if so, what. About two-thirds (32) said yes, and 3 said maybe or they did not know. Of the 26 evacuees who would or might do something differently, 17 said they would do more to protect property, including moving more items out of their homes or moving items higher. Three said they would leave sooner. Only one evacuee said she might stay next time (because of delays in accessing her property after the storm). Nine (of 10) nonevacuees said they would or might do something differently next time. Five said they would leave or would probably leave, and four would do more to protect property. Other things that interviewees would do differently include purchasing more supplies, purchasing a generator, finding a motel room earlier, handling pets differently, and purchasing flood insurance. These results indicate that the vast majority of evacuees we interviewed did not regret leaving prior to Hurricane Ike, and a number of the nonevacuees would likely leave if a similar hurricane threatened. More generally, as found by Zhang et al. (2007) for Hurricane Rita, many interviewees—evacuees and nonevacuees—learned things from Ike that may help them respond to future hurricane threats.

5) Future evacuation

Following several previous studies, we asked interviewees about their anticipated evacuation decision for a future category 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 hurricane (Fig. 5). All interviewees were able to answer the question immediately and indicated the same or increasing likelihood to evacuate as the storm intensity increased. As we discuss further in section 3c, this suggests widespread understanding of the Saffir–Simpson scale among our interviewees, at least at a general level. Most said they would not evacuate for a category 1 storm. For a category 2 storm, nearly half would evacuate. For a category 3 or higher storm, most would evacuate. Although we cannot draw general conclusions given the sample, these results are broadly similar to those from other studies of Texas Gulf coast residents (e.g., Lindell et al. 2001; Lindell and Prater 2007; Zhang et al. 2007). This suggests that many people in the areas studied would evacuate if an intense hurricane threatened in the near future. Some, however, would still want to evaluate the situation for themselves, even given a category 4 or 5 storm and an evacuation recommendation from authorities.

1) Sources of and exposure to forecasts

Figure 6 shows where interviewees reported getting forecast information about Hurricane Ike before the storm. The vast majority (all but three) got at least some information from television. The next most common source was the Internet, followed by family and friends, radio, and newspapers. Interviewees reported using an average of 3.5 of the 7 source options provided, indicating that many obtained hurricane information from multiple venues. This supports the discussion in section 3b and earlier findings (Dow and Cutter 1998, 2000; Zhang et al. 2007) that, given the volume of information available from diverse media venues, many coastal residents now obtain hurricane information from multiple sources for use in assessing their own risk.

Interviewees were then asked which of these sources was overall most important to them in obtaining information about Ike and why. More than two-thirds said television, most commonly local television. This agrees with earlier work that news media, specifically television, is a key information source as a hurricane approaches (Gladwin and Peacock 1997; Dow and Cutter 1998, 2000; Zhang et al. 2007). Interviewees said television was important because of its updated, round-the-clock, and convenient coverage, as well as the knowledge and information provided by trusted local broadcasters. This is corroborated by earlier research results indicating that people tend to develop relationships with specific media sources—particularly individuals—and many find television a trustworthy and expert source of hazard information and recommendations (Driscoll and Salwen 1996; Sherman-Morris 2005; Phillips and Morrow 2007).

About 20% of interviewees said the Internet was their most important source because of its accessibility or the up-to-date or detailed information it provided. This suggests, as discussed in Dow and Cutter (2000), that new technologies such as the Internet are becoming key sources of hurricane risk information for some populations. The importance of such sources compared to “traditional” media is an issue for more in-depth investigation in future work.

We examined people’s exposure to Hurricane Ike forecasts from two additional perspectives. First, we asked interviewees how frequently they obtained forecast information for Ike prior to the storm (Fig. 7). More than 90% checked forecasts more than once a day, and about half reported checking forecasts once an hour or constantly. We also asked interviewees whether they heard a forecast for Hurricane Ike at two different times before the storm hit the Texas coast (Fig. 8). Ninety percent reported hearing a forecast 5 days in advance, and all reported hearing a forecast 3 days in advance. These results suggest that several days before Hurricane Ike reached the coast, many Texas coastal residents were aware of the threat and obtaining forecast information frequently to evaluate their risk. This is corroborated by similar findings by Gladwin and Peacock (1997) for Hurricane Andrew, Dow and Cutter (2000) for Hurricane Floyd, and Zhang et al. (2007) for Hurricane Rita. However, as discussed in sections 3a and 3b, a significant portion of our interviewees did not adequately prepare for flooding and were surprised by the extent of Ike’s flooding and the resulting damage. Thus, further study is needed of what people actually hear and understand from the hurricane threat and preparation information to which they are exposed. For example, one interviewee noted that although the television in her home was on nearly constantly leading up to the storm, she and her family were busy preparing and so rarely paid full attention.

2) Perceptions of forecast confidence and quality

We investigated interviewees’ perceptions of forecasts from a few interrelated perspectives. To examine trust in forecasts and perceptions of forecast uncertainty, we asked interviewees about their confidence in forecasts of Ike at 3- and 5-day lead times (Fig. 8). Overall, interviewees tended to have medium to high confidence and somewhat higher confidence in 3-day than 5-day forecasts. We also asked interviewees about their overall perception of quality in Ike forecasts and how much confidence they will have in future hurricane forecasts (Fig. 9). Most interviewees rated forecasts as having medium to high quality and expressed medium to high confidence in future hurricane forecasts. These results are similar to those reported by Zhang et al. (2007) in their study following Hurricane Rita. These data, along with the additional comments interviewees provided, suggest that most interviewees were generally satisfied with the forecasts of Hurricane Ike.

3) Perceptions of the Saffir–Simpson scale

One of the primary mechanisms currently used to communicate hurricane intensity and expected effects to members of the public and other decision makers is the Saffir–Simpson scale. Although Ike was a category 2 storm as it approached the Texas coast and at landfall, it generated higher storm surge and more damage than many people expected. People’s perceptions of Ike’s intensity and its effects may affect their interpretations of future hurricane forecasts. People’s opinions of Ike at landfall also provide information about how well they think the Saffir–Simpson scale communicates hurricane risk. Thus, we asked interviewees what category hurricane they thought Ike was when it hit Galveston. Every interviewee—including those for whom English was not a first language and those who had recently moved to the area—immediately knew what was meant by a “category” of hurricane. While our sample is small, this corroborates the discussion in section 3b and Morss and Zhang (2008) that the Saffir–Simpson scale is a salient risk communication mechanism for many, if not most, residents of areas such as the Texas Gulf coast.

As shown in Fig. 10, more than half of respondents knew that Ike was a category 2 hurricane at landfall. Not surprisingly given Ike’s effects, most of the remaining interviewees thought Ike was stronger. Although we did not ask for additional comments about Hurricane Ike’s intensity or the Saffir–Simpson scale, more than one-third of the interviewees provided them. The most common comment was that even though Ike might have officially been a category 2 (or 3) hurricane, the surge or flooding was that of a category 4 or 5 hurricane (or even worse). Others said that even though Ike was officially a category 2 storm, they thought it was stronger based on the damage they saw. Two specifically commented that Ike’s wind speeds or its rating on the Saffir–Simpson scale did not accurately reflect the damage it caused. Two others said they thought that Ike’s winds were different “categories” at different levels, that is, ground level compared to 100 ft or to where National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) aircraft measure winds offshore.

These responses indicate that, for some, the Saffir–Simpson scale did not adequately represent the risk posed by Ike (see also Houston Chronicle, 29 November 2008). Thus, while the Saffir–Simpson scale has served its original purpose as a simple, well-understood mechanism for communicating hurricane intensity (Simpson and Saffir 1974), different scales may be useful for communicating different types of risks associated with a landfalling hurricane, such as wind damage, storm surge, and inland flooding (Morss and Zhang 2008). In recognition of these issues, the National Hurricane Center (NHC) is testing an experimental Saffir–Simpson hurricane wind scale (NHC 2009), the NWS is considering a storm surge warning product separate from hurricane wind warnings, and NWS offices are developing products to communicate local hurricane effects. To help develop new mechanisms for communicating hurricane risk that are as effective as possible, formal testing with broad audiences would be valuable. The importance of such message testing is indicated by people’s response to the “certain death” statement issued by the NWS prior to Hurricane Ike, discussed next.

4) Perceptions and use of “certain death” statement

Beginning on the evening of Thursday, 11 September, the Houston–Galveston NWS office began trying to communicate Ike’s potential effects by issuing statements that described the anticipated storm surge and included the phrase “Persons not heeding evacuation orders in single family one or two story homes will [may] face certain death.” The “certain death” portion of the statement was widely reported in the local and national media. To investigate the effectiveness of this NWS statement, we asked interviewees whether they heard the statement; those who had were asked where they heard it, what their opinion of it was before Hurricane Ike hit the coast, and whether and how it affected their decision to prepare or evacuate.

About 70% of interviewees (35) said they heard this statement before Hurricane Ike hit the coast. More than two-thirds of those who remembered where they heard the statement said they heard it from television, corroborating the earlier discussion about the importance of television as a source of information about an approaching hurricane. Other sources included radio, the Internet, and other people.

Of those who heard the statement, 14 expressed opinions that were generally positive; for example, they said they believed the statement or it increased their awareness of the risk. Thirteen expressed negative opinions; for example, they did not believe the statement or thought it was exaggerated or too extreme. Four expressed opinions that were mixed, and the remainder could not be categorized. Most of those who had heard the statement recognized it immediately, and many had a strong opinion about it. Positive phrases used to describe the statement include “blunt … effective,” “correct,” “to the point,” “scared you to death,” and “people who didn’t heed were foolish.” Negative phrases include “harsh and overreactive,” “overblown,” “ridiculous,” “humorous,” “stupid,” “rude,” and “not appropriate.” Some noted the trade-off between scaring people too much and convincing people to leave. For example, one interviewee thought the statement was too extreme but understands some people do not listen; another said that although the statement was very true and people should leave, it added too much stress and was very disturbing. Overall, some said they took it seriously, and others said they did not.

The “certain death” statement made a strong impression on a number of people. But how did it affect their decisions leading up to Ike? More than two-thirds (25) of the interviewees who heard the statement said that it did not affect their decision to prepare or evacuate. This is in part because many people had already left their residences by the time the statement was issued. Of the 10 whose decision was affected, 8 said it helped them decide to evacuate, and 2 said it reinforced the decision they had already made to evacuate. For example, one interviewee said the statement helped her talk her husband into leaving; another said that it made her realize the storm would be bigger than expected. One said that the statement was the “biggest factor in being convinced to evacuate”; another simply said “that’s why I left.”

These results suggest that the NWS statement motivated at least a few people to leave and thus may have saved lives. However, some people who had strong negative opinions about the statement indicated that it might decrease their sensitivity to communication of future hurricane threats. For example, one nonevacuee said that such statements make him lose confidence; another said the statement made him want to stay “to show them he’s not going to die.” This illustrates the importance of learning how to effectively communicate the risk associated with a threatening hurricane, in ways that motivate people at high risk to take action without substantially reducing future response.

5) Additional information needed by members of the public

To help improve information provision and decision making about future hurricanes, we asked interviewees if there was information they needed before Hurricane Ike hit the coast but did not get. Twenty percent (10) said yes and were asked what additional information they needed. Six mentioned better predictions of the storm’s track, surge, flooding, and/or effects. For example, one person said that nobody knew about the (flood) water, and that “everyone would have done something different if they knew.” Two mentioned information about flood preparations, and one wanted notification to leave sooner. Of those who did not report needing additional information, one commented that she had been to a hurricane preparedness meeting and was aware of necessary steps to secure property and safeguard her family. Another stated that there was a lot of information, and it was a matter of whether one paid attention and heeded the warnings. As discussed earlier, these results indicate that while some people understood the risks posed by Ike, others did not.